Is Disinflation Good for the Stock Market? by Peter Blair Henry
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Summers (1985) argues that there is an absence of research on major questions 
that fall between economics and finance.  Almost twenty years later, this contention still 
rings true with respect to issues of disinflation and the stock market.  A large literature in 
macroeconomics is concerned with the effect of inflation stabilization on real variables, 
such as employment, output and wages (Easterly, 1996; Fischer, 1986; Friedman, 1968; 
Gordon, 1982; Lucas, 1973; Okun, 1978; Phelps 1968; Sargent, 1982; Tobin, 1972; 
Végh, 1992).  However, none of these papers systematically examined the effect of 
disinflation on the real price of equity.  On the other hand, financial economists have 
studied the relationship between inflation and stock returns (Fama and Schwert, 1977; 
Fama, 1981; Schwert, 1981; Stulz, 1986), but none of these papers analyzed the effect of 
inflation stabilization programs on the stock market.  Simply put, previous research in 
macroeconomics and finance has not directly addressed the following question.  Are 
disinflation programs good for the stock market? 
This paper provides an answer by analyzing how stock markets respond to the 
adoption of inflation stabilization programs.  In a well-functioning and rational stock 
market, changes in stock prices reflect both revised expectations about future corporate 
profits and the discount rate at which those profits are capitalized.  In principle, an 
inflation stabilization program may affect both expected future profits and discount rates.  
For example, contractionary measures taken to stabilize inflation may raise discount rates 
and reduce profits in the short run.  However, the reduction in inflation may increase 
future profits and reduce discount rates.  Therefore, an unanticipated change in the stock 
market in response to the news of disinflation measures the expected net benefit (current 
and future) of the stabilization program.   2
The average unanticipated stock market response associated with the 81 
disinflation episodes studied in this paper is empirically estimated using the dummy 
variable regression framework employed by Stulz (2000a, b).  The results show that the 
stock market response to the adoption of a stabilization program depends on the level of 
inflation.  When countries attempt to stabilize annual inflation that is high (above 40 
percent), on average, the stock market appreciates by 24 percent in real dollar terms.  In 
contrast, if the pre-stabilization inflation rate is moderate (below 40 percent), the market 
response is economically weak and statistically insignificant. 
The results are not sensitive to the particular definitions of high and moderate 
inflation, which are taken from Easterly (1996) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1993).  The 
same conclusion is also reached for stock market responses conditional on alternative 
classifications of high and moderate inflation. 
Reporting the results in real dollar terms requires caution, however.  In countries 
with high inflation, the rate of depreciation of the official nominal exchange rate may not 
keep pace with inflation.  Under such a scenario, the real dollar value of the stock market 
may become artificially inflated.  To account for this possibility, the central estimations 
are also performed using real local-currency stock returns.  They yield the same result.  
The stock market responds in a positive and statistically significant manner when a 
country attempts to stabilize high inflation, but there is no significant market response if 
the pre-stabilization inflation rate is moderate.   
It is important to know whether this result is driven by variation in the types of 
stabilization policies used in high versus moderate inflation.  The data suggest that this is 
not the case.  Sixty-nine of the 81 stabilization programs studied in this paper are   3
identified by IMF agreements.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been 
criticized in recent years for the uniformity of its policy prescriptions in all country 
agreements, irrespective of differences in initial macroeconomic conditions and in 
country-specific idiosyncrasies (Corden, 1998).  The homogeneity of the Fund’s 
stabilization prescriptions across countries suggests that there are not major differences 
between the packages of stabilization policies pursued in the high and moderate inflation 
subsamples.   
On the other hand, if countries attempt to reduce inflation without help from the 
IMF, they may pursue stabilization policies that differ from those prescribed by the Fund.  
For example, 12 of the 81 stabilization episodes studied in this paper did not involve an 
official agreement with the IMF.  All 12 of these programs were directed at stabilizing 
high inflation.  In 8 of these 12 episodes, the countries involved attempted to stabilize 
inflation by fixing the nominal exchange rate.  In contrast, none of the IMF episodes 
involved exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS).  Furthermore, there is an extensive 
literature which demonstrates that the short-run real effects of ERBS differ substantially 
from those observed in more traditional stabilization programs, such as those pursued by 
the Fund (Végh, 1992; Calvo and Végh, 1998; Fischer, Sahay and Végh, 1999).   
Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the differential stock market responses 
are driven by differences between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.  Various 
robustness checks in Section II suggest that this is not the case.   
After grappling with concerns about robustness, Section III turns to the issue of 
how to interpret the central result.  Stabilizing high inflation increases the present value 
of shareholders’ claims, whereas stabilizing moderate inflation has no effect.  The   4
principle question is:  Do the results imply that stabilizing high inflation increases the 
present value of aggregate output while stabilizing moderate inflation does not?  This 
question must be addressed with caution.  Stabilizing inflation could increase capital’s 
share in national output.  In turn, increasing capital’s share in GDP could generate higher 
future profits (and therefore stock prices), even if stabilization has no effect on GDP 
levels or on growth rates.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that stabilizing high inflation 
increases the present value of aggregate output.  More generally, conclusions about the 
effect of disinflation on the present value of aggregate output cannot be directly inferred 
from the stock market responses.   
Accordingly, Section III of the paper pursues a narrower question.  Do stock 
market responses to disinflation rationally forecast stabilization outcomes for the 
economy, apart from the publicly traded corporate sector?  Two approaches are 
employed.  To the extent that the stock market response reflects the expected change in 
the present value of profits from stabilizing inflation, it should have some predictive 
power for the ex-post change in inflation.  Hence, the first approach asks whether the 
stock market response helps predict the ex-post change in inflation.  The second approach 
explores whether the unexpected change in the stock market helps predicts GDP growth, 
following the stabilization.  While these two approaches do not provide definitive 
evidence, the stock market responses do help predict the change in inflation and output in 
the year following efforts to stabilize both high and moderate inflation.  This suggests 
that the stock market evidence is not spurious.  
The stock market approach to evaluating the real effects of disinflation has three 
limitations.  First, stock price responses capture the expected net benefits of stabilization   5
to shareholders, not necessarily to the entire economy.  Second, stock price responses 
measure the change in real wealth that accrues to domestic shareholders, not utility gains 
per se.
1  Third, to the extent that stabilizations are anticipated, the measured unanticipated 
change in equity prices will understate the expected impact of disinflation. 
Despite these limitations, the stock market approach has at least three distinct 
advantages.  First, there is ample evidence that an unbiased assessment of the effects of 
public information releases is quickly incorporated into stock prices (Fama, 1976).  In 
particular, stock prices in the subset of countries relevant for this paper respond to news 
of major economic policy reforms (Henry, 2000a, b).  Second, the stock market focuses 
the policy debate on the relevant issue of whether the benefits of disinflation outweigh 
the costs.  Third, the stock market analysis provides a new set of facts about disinflation, 
which suggest that stabilizing high and moderate inflation have very different real effects. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section I summarizes the data and presents 
descriptive findings.  Section II presents the empirical methodology, central results, and 
robustness checks.  Section III examines whether the stock market responses rationally 
forecast outcomes for inflation and aggregate output.  Section IV explains how the stock 
market approach to analyzing the real effects of disinflation relates to the previous 
literature.  Section V discusses objections to and alternative interpretations of the results.  
Section VI presents the conclusions. 
 
I. Data and Descriptive Findings 
The implementation month and year of the 81 inflation stabilization programs are 
                                                 
1 A rise in expected future productivity can decrease the value of the stock market value if discount rates 
rise by more than the increase in expected future dividends (Lucas, 1978).  Nevertheless, welfare improves.   6
identified using two sources.  The first source of event dates is Calvo and Végh (1998).  
They identify the best-known stabilizations that received a great deal of attention in the 
literature on inflation stabilization.  The second source is the Annual Reports of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  These reports are used to construct a time series of 
months in which each of the 21 countries implemented a stabilization program through an 
official agreement with the IMF.  For example, Argentina signed an IMF agreement in 
September of 1977.  Thus September of 1977 is an implementation date for Argentina. 
IMF programs typically call for current account stabilization in addition to 
inflation stabilization.  The dual stabilization objectives of these programs do not 
introduce important biases into the dating procedure.  The macroeconomic targets in IMF 
programs are generated by the IMF’s Financial Programming Model, which is based on 
the monetary approach to the balance of payments (Agénor and Montiel, 1996).  Under 
the monetary approach, balance of payments problems originate from an excess supply of 
money, with monetization of the government deficit typically seen as the proximate cause 
of the excess supply.  The IMF requires that countries reduce both the fiscal deficit and 
the growth rate of the money supply in order to stabilize their current account.  Thus, the 
prescription for stabilizing the current account is tantamount to a traditional disinflation 
program.  In fact, the IMF has been intensely criticized in recent years for the uniformity 
of its policy prescriptions in all country agreements (Corden, 1998). 
Including the recent IMF agreements in Mexico in 1995, Asia in 1997, Russia in 
1998, and Brazil in 1999 would strengthen the central findings of this paper, because 
these countries were experiencing moderate inflation and stock prices collapsed during 
the months leading up to their agreements with the IMF.  Nevertheless, these episodes are   7
excluded from the sample for two reasons.  First, Dornbusch (1998a) argues that the 
synopsis of stabilization outlined in the preceding paragraph does not provide an accurate 
description of these recent episodes.  He argues that the recent episodes were not inflation 
crises per se, but financial crises; the proximate cause was country balance sheets whose 
assets and liabilities were misaligned with respect to both maturity structure and currency 
denomination.  Second, as part of these recent agreements, the IMF has imposed major 
structural and institutional reforms in addition to insisting on its traditional short-run 
stabilization objectives (Feldstein, 1998).   
High inflation episodes are defined as in Easterly (1996) and Bruno and Easterly 
(1998): 12-month inflation in excess of 40 percent during each of the 24 months leading 
up to and including the month in which the stabilization was implemented.  Moderate 
inflation episodes are defined analogously: 12-month inflation between 10 and 40 percent 
during each of the 24 months leading up to and including the month in which the 
stabilization was implemented.  This definition of moderate inflation corresponds closely 
to that of Dornbusch and Fischer (1993). 
Fourteen of the 81 attempted inflation stabilizations are Calvo and Végh (1998) 
episodes, 2 of which coincide with IMF agreements (Mexico, 1977; Argentina, 1991).  
Thirteen of the 25 attempts at stabilizing high inflation have official IMF sponsorship, 
and 7 succeed in reducing high inflation to moderate inflation.  Seventeen of the 25 
episodes occur in Argentina and Brazil.  All 56 of the attempts at stabilizing moderate 
inflation have official IMF sponsorship, and 5 succeeded in reducing moderate inflation 
to low inflation.  Table A1 in the Data Appendix provides details about all of the inflation 
stabilization programs identified using both data sources.     8
The sample includes all countries that: (1) have publicly available stock market 
data and (2) have undertaken at least one inflation stabilization program (as defined in 
Section IIIB) at some point since their stock market data became readily available.  The 
21 countries that satisfy both criteria are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.  The principal 
source of stock market data is the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Emerging 
Markets Data Base (EMDB).  Stock price indices for individual countries are the 
dividend-inclusive, U.S. dollar-denominated IFC Global Index.  For most countries, 
EMDB’s coverage begins in December 1975, but for others coverage only begins in 
December 1984.  For those countries for which the IFC does not provide stock market 
data, the analysis uses the share price index given in the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (IFS).  Each country’s U.S. dollar-denominated stock price index is deflated by 
the U.S. consumer price index (CPI), which comes from the IFS.  All of the data are 
monthly.  The consumer price index for each country is also obtained from the IFS.  
Returns and inflation are calculated as the first difference of the natural logarithm of the 
real stock price and CPI, respectively.   
 
I.B.  Descriptive Findings 
There are two key questions to be asked about the relationship between the stock 
market response and the level of inflation that the stabilization program is attempting to 
reduce.  First, does the magnitude of the stock market response increase or decrease as a 
function of the level of initial inflation?  Second, what is the sign of the stock market   9
response and does the sign depend on the level of inflation?   
 
I.B.1.  Is the Market Response an Increasing Function of Ex-Ante Inflation? 
Figure 1 provides a rough empirical answer to the first question: The net benefits 
of stabilization appear to be an increasing function of the level of ex-ante inflation.   
Month “0” is defined as the month in which a given stabilization program is 
implemented.  The IFC records the value of a country’s stock market index at the end of 
the month.  The data on stabilization events do not provide the day of the month on which 
programs are implemented.  These facts imply that the implementation of a given 
stabilization program may occur after the day of the month on which the IFC recorded 
prices.  In such cases, the change in the stock market index in month [0] may not reflect 
the news of the stabilization event.  Accordingly, Figure 1 plots the unadjusted 
cumulative change in the real dollar value of the stock market index in months [0, +1] 
against the average 12-month inflation rate over the two years prior to implementation.  
Figure 1 suggests that the two-month stock price change is an increasing function of the 
ex-ante inflation rate.  The higher the ex-ante inflation rate, the greater the stock price 
response when a stabilization program is implemented. 
The positive linear relationship apparent in Figure 1 is given by the following 
regression equation (robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2 R =0.10, N=81): 
[0, 1] ln( ) 3.73 0.076* stockprice inflation + ∆= +                                                                    (2) 
                                     (1.4)   (1.9)   
The unconditional relationship is statistically significant but the relationship is 
also noisy.  There are a number of high inflation episodes for which the actual stock price 
change is close to zero.  Explanations for these outliers are considered in Section IV.C.1.    10
 
I.B.2.  Is the Sign of the Response Uniform Across All Ranges of Ex-Ante Inflation? 
 
Figure 1 shows that, on average, the expected net benefits of stabilizing appear to 
be roughly zero near the origin, but are clearly positive at high levels of inflation.  Table 
1 investigates this feature of the data for three different groupings of the 81 stabilization 
episodes based on levels of average inflation prior to implementation.  The first grouping 
corresponds to the Bruno and Easterly (1998) classification of high versus moderate 
inflation; the second simply divides the total sample into two groups of equal size: high 
inflation (40 cases) and moderate inflation (41 cases).  The third comparison splits the 
sample into three groups of equal size: high inflation (27 cases), moderate inflation (27 
cases), and low inflation (27 cases). The alternative classification schemes are useful for 
checking whether the results are sensitive to the Bruno and Easterly inflation 
classification.  In particular, the two-way numerical split creates a superset of the Bruno 
and Easterly high inflation episodes that is not dominated by Argentina and Brazil.   
Seventeen of the 25 Bruno and Easterly high inflation episodes are in Argentina and 
Brazil.   
The first three rows of Table 1 report summary statistics for the number of 
country episodes, the median inflation rate and the median stock price response for the 
high and moderate categories under each inflation classification scheme.  The fourth row 
identifies the number of country episodes for which the stock-price change over the two-
month-implementation window is less than the country-specific median two-month stock 
price change. 
The last row of Table 1 reports the two-sided p-value of observing at most the   11
corresponding number of stock-price responses to stabilization below their country-
specific median two-month percentage stock-price change.  The sign tests are significant 
at the one percent level for the high-inflation episodes under all three inflation 
classification schemes.  The sign tests are never significant for the moderate-inflation 
episodes.  These sign tests should be treated with caution, because they are based on raw 
returns.  However, the consistency of the findings suggests that more careful 
measurements of the stock market response to stabilizing high versus moderate inflation 
may not be overly sensitive to any particular classification scheme.  For brevity and 
comparability to previous work, the next section of the paper estimates the stock market 
response to stabilization conditional on inflation being high or moderate in the Easterly 
(1996) and Bruno and Easterly (1998) sense. 
 
II.  Methodology and Results 
The average stock market response to implementation of an inflation stabilization 
program is estimated using a simple dummy variable regression framework as in Rose 
(1985).  Under the assumption that markets are efficient, a country’s stock market index 
will adjust to information about changes in expected future profits or discount rates.   
Measuring the response of share prices to inflation stabilization events enables us to infer 
whether the expected net benefits of stabilizing inflation are positive or negative. 
Following Stulz (2000a, b), the world capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used 
to measure the expected return on each country’s stock market index.  The abnormal 
return associated with a stabilization event is the residual from this model.  This implies a 
stochastic return generating process for country iof the following form that is possibly 
affected by inflation stabilization events:   12
12
W
it i t it it it R R HIGH MOD α βγ γ ε =+ + + +                                                                      (3). 
it R  is the real return in dollars on country i’s stock market index in month t.  
W
t R  is the 
real return in dollars on the Morgan Stanley Capital Market Index (MSCI) world stock 
market index in month t.   it HIGH  is a dummy variable that is equal to one in high-
inflation-stabilization months [0, +1] in country i.   it MOD  is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one in moderate-inflation-stabilization months [0, +1] in country i.  The 
constant intercept term, α , implicitly assumes perfect capital market integration.
2   
Alternative specifications that allow for country-specific intercepts are also examined and 
yield similar results.  
The usual assumption that  it ε  is a serially uncorrelated, random error term 
requires further discussion.  Equation (3) is estimated using Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS).  An assumption of no serial correlation in stock returns could be 
justified on the grounds of rational expectations, but the estimation procedure will allow 
for the possibility of serial correlation.  The estimation procedure also allows for 
heteroscedasticity across countries.  However, with an unbalanced panel it is not possible 
to relax the assumption of no contemporaneous correlation of the error term across 
countries.  Therefore, a number of indirect precautions are taken.   
First, short estimation windows are used in all of the central results; the 
assumption that country abnormal returns are not contemporaneously correlated is 
reasonable if event windows do not overlap in calendar time and overlaps occur less 
frequently with short windows.  The HIGH and MODERATE stabilization dummies are 
                                                 
2 For conceptual discussions of the world CAPM see Frankel (1994); Stulz (1999a); Tesar (1999); Tesar 
and Werner (1998); Tesar and Werner (1995).   13
on for two-month windows, [0, +1].  Estimates using one-month windows, [0], are also 
provided.  Second, the extent to which contemporaneous correlation is likely to be a 
problem with short windows was investigated.  With two-month and one-month 
estimation windows, 29 of the 162 and 11 of the 81 event periods overlap, respectively.  
These numbers suggest that a small fraction of the abnormal returns from (3) will 
potentially be affected by contemporaneous correlation.  Third, two of the alternative 
regression specifications to equation (3) will estimate abnormal returns relative to the 
IFC’s emerging stock market index.  Since all of the sample countries are emerging 
markets, the inclusion of a composite emerging market index as a right-hand-side 
variable will partially control for contemporaneously correlated disturbance terms in the 
spirit of Ozler (1989).
3  Including the emerging market index does not change the results. 
Equation (3) constrains the coefficient on HIGH to be the same across all months.  
Thus, the parameter  1 γ  measures the average monthly stock market response to all 
attempted stabilizations of high inflation.  Similarly,  2 γ  measures the average monthly 
response to all attempted stabilizations of moderate inflation.  Since the dummy variable 
for the event window is two-months long, the total stock market response to each type of 
stabilization attempt is given by two times the parameter estimate.  A different estimation 
technique would be to use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).  This approach would 
have the advantage of providing a unique coefficient estimate for each country for each 
event.  However, there are also several disadvantages to this approach.  First, the low 
power of hypothesis tests in unconstrained systems severely weakens the ability of the 
                                                 
3 Ozler estimates a pooled cross-section time series dummy variable model to estimate the average effect of 
international debt restructuring on U.S. bank stock returns.  Bank abnormal returns are estimated relative to 
returns on the U.S. stock market.  She controls for contemporaneous correlation across banks by also 
including the return on a portfolio of banking industry securities on the right-hand side.   14
event study methodology to detect the impact of the event (Rose, 1985).  Second, SUR 
requires a balanced panel.  Due to the limited time series availability of stock market 
data, creating a balanced panel would result in discarding almost half of the 81 
stabilization events.  Given data limitations, the pooled cross-section time series 
framework seems appropriate. 
 
II.A.  Stock Market Reactions to Attempted Stabilizations of High Versus 
           Moderate Inflation 
 
In order to isolate the effects of stabilization, Panel A of Table 2 presents 
estimates of HIGH and MODERATE.  The first row presents estimates from the 
benchmark specification given by equation (3).  Heteroscedastic-consistent standard 
errors are reported in parentheses.  The estimated coefficient on HIGH is 0.121 and is 
significant at the one-percent level.  This means that the stock market increases by an 
average of 12.1 percent per month in real dollar terms when governments attempt to 
stabilize high inflation.  Therefore, the total stock market increase associated with the 
HIGH implementation window is 24.2 percent in real dollar terms.  The estimated 
coefficient on MODERATE is 0.001 and is not statistically significant.  Therefore, the 
stock market response to stabilizing moderate inflation is not significantly different from 
0.  The column labeled “P-Value of HIGH > MODERATE” shows that the p-value for a 
test that the coefficient on HIGH equals the coefficient on MODERATE is 0.01.   
Therefore, the coefficient on HIGH is significantly larger than the coefficient on 
MODERATE. 
Table 2 also presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using alternative 
specifications.  Row 2 presents estimates that use real US stock returns, 
US
t R , in place of   15
W
t R  in equation (3).  Row 3 presents estimates that use the real dollar return on the IFC 
Emerging Market index, 
LDC
t R , in place of 
W
t R .  Row 4 presents estimates that use all 
three sets of returns simultaneously.  As an alternative to the market model in equation 
(3), Row 5 presents estimates based on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns: 
12 it it it it R HIGH MODERATE α γγ ε =+ + +                                                                       (4). 
As a final specification, Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model in which 
mean-returns may differ across countries by allowing for country-specific intercept 
terms: 
12 it i it it it R HIGH MODERATE α γγ ε =+ + +                                                                      (5). 
Letting the intercept terms vary across countries allows for the possibility that average 
expected returns may differ across countries due to imperfect capital integration.
4 
  The central result is the same under all six specifications.  The stock market 
responds positively and significantly to attempts at stabilizing high inflation, with the 
average effect ranging from 11.3 to 12.2 percent per month.  Thus, the total effect is 
between 22.6 and 24.4 percent.  The response to stabilizing moderate inflation is small 
and never significant.  The estimate of HIGH is always significantly larger than the 
estimate of MODERATE.  Panel B of Table 2 also presents estimates based on month [0] 
only.  These estimates closely match the month [0, +1] estimates.  In some cases, the 
month [0] estimate is smaller than the month [0, +1] estimate, which suggests that not all 
of price change is captured in month [0]. 
As a final robustness check, the analysis explores whether the results are sensitive 
                                                 
4 For surveys of the literature on imperfect capital market integration see: Stulz (1999a, b); Tesar (1999); 
Tesar and Werner (1998).  For empirical evidence on the real effects of increased capital market integration 
see: Collins (1999); Henry (2000a, b).   16
to whether real returns are measured in dollars or local currency units.  The potential 
problem is that in high-inflation countries, the rate of depreciation of the nominal 
exchange rate may not keep pace with inflation.  If inflation exceeds the rate of nominal 
depreciation, then the currency is appreciating in real terms, which means that the real 
dollar value of the stock market may become artificially inflated.  In order to see whether 
the results in Table 2 are driven by real appreciation of the local currency vis-à-vis the 
dollar, all of the regressions were re-estimated using real local currency returns instead of 
real dollar returns as the left-hand-side variable.
5  The results were virtually identical to 
the estimates that use dollar-denominated returns. 
 
II.B.  Are the Differences Between High and Moderate Inflation Driven by Market 
          Anticipation? 
 
The estimates in Table 2 may understate the stock market response if the market 
anticipates stabilizations.  In particular, suppose that news of future stabilization attempts 
are announced or leaked to the public.  Countries with high inflation also have a long 
history of failures.  Thus, the market may be less prone to believe announcements by 
these governments.  If this is the case, the stock market may increase in anticipation of 
stabilizing moderate inflation.  Under this scenario we would incorrectly infer that there 
are significant differences in the market response to attempted stabilizations of high and 
moderate inflation.   
To explore this possibility, equation (3) is used to estimate abnormal returns and 
                                                 
5 As another robustness check, the dividend yield, D/P, was also used as a left-hand –side variable.  The 
dividend yield is a real variable that has no currency units, since the exchange rate appears in both the 
numerator and the denomintaor.  In the Gordon Model, D/P=r-g, where r is the discount rate on equity and 
g is the expected growth rate of dividends.  The results using dividend yields as a LHS variable are 
consistent with those based on real returns measured in both dollars and local currency. 
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cumulative abnormal returns for the 12 months prior and the 12 months following 
attempted stabilizations of high and moderate inflation.  Two important caveats are in 
order here.  First, in the span of a 24-month window there is lot that could be going on 
and the estimates do not control for this.  Second, with long estimation windows, the 
problem of overlapping event windows is likely to be more severe and the standard errors 
are therefore more subject to problems stemming from cross-country correlation in the 
error term.  Keeping these limitations in mind, the numbers may be useful in providing a 
crude sense of whether the market anticipates stabilizations. 
Table 3 presents the results.  There is no substantial run-up in prices preceding 
attempted stabilizations of high inflation.  The cumulative abnormal return from month –
12 to –1 is close to 0.  In the case of moderate inflation, the market experiences a 
cumulative fall of about 16 percent.  This fall in prices is consistent with the view that 
stabilization of moderate inflation is a negative net present value event for shareholders 
and the market anticipates these events.  This fact reinforces the differences between 
HIGH and MODERATE evident in Table 2 
 
II. C.  Are the Results Driven by Differences in the Policies Used in High and 
Moderate Inflation? 
 
The evidence in Sections II.A and II.B suggest two key results.  The stock market 
responds positively and significantly when a country attempts to stabilize high inflation.  
There is no significant market response if the pre-stabilization inflation rate is moderate.  
It is important to know whether these results are driven by variation in the types of 
stabilization policies used in high versus moderate inflation.  The uniformity of IMF 
programs suggests that there are not major differences between the packages of   18
stabilization policies pursued in IMF-sponsored attempts at stabilizing high and moderate 
inflation.  However, 12 of the 81 stabilization episodes studied in this paper did not 
involve an official agreement with the IMF.  All 12 of these programs were directed at 
stabilizing high inflation.  In 8 of these 12 episodes, the countries involved attempted to 
stabilize inflation by fixing the nominal exchange rate.  In contrast, none of the IMF 
episodes involved exchange-rate-based stabilizations (ERBS).  Therefore, it is important 
to investigate whether the differential stock market responses are driven by differences 
between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.   
Three robustness checks suggest that this is not the case.  First, the average stock 
market reaction to ERBS is statistically indistinguishable from those for non-ERBS.   
Second, the difference between the average stock market response to attempted 
stabilizations of high and moderate inflation remains economically and statistically 
significant when the non-IMF-sponsored programs are excluded from the high inflation 
sample.  Third, there is no significant difference between the average stock market 
reaction to the attempted stabilization of high inflation in the IMF and non-IMF 
subsamples.  Subsections II.C.1 and II.C.2 provide the details about these robustness 
checks. 
 
II.C.1  Are the High Inflation Results Exclusively an Exchange-Rate-Based 
Stabilization Phenomenon? 
There is an extensive literature on inflation stabilization in developing countries, 
which demonstrates that countries that have stabilized inflation by fixing the nominal 
exchange rate have experienced output booms (Calvo and Végh, 1998; Fischer et al., 
1999; Végh, 1992).  All of these exchange-rate-based stabilization (ERBS) episodes were   19
implemented in high-inflation regimes.  Therefore, this subsection investigates whether 
the positive and significant stock market response to the attempted stabilization of high 
inflation reported in Table 2 is unique to ERBS, or is a more general outcome associated 
with stabilizing high inflation.   
In order to address this issue, the 25 attempts at stabilizing high inflation are split 
into two groups: those that were exchange-rate-based and those that were not.  A total of 
8 of these 25 episodes are identified as exchange-rate-based stabilizations by Calvo and 
Végh (1998) and Fischer et al. (1999).  After separating these two kinds of stabilizations 
the following panel regression is estimated: 
12
W
it i t it it it R R NONERBS ERBS α βγ γ ε =+ + + +                                                              (6). 
NONERBS  is a dummy variable that equals 1 in months [0, +1] of all non-exchange-
rate-based attempts at stabilizing high inflation.  ERBS  is a dummy variable that equals 
1 in months [0, +1] of all exchange-rate-based attempts at stabilizing high inflation. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficients on ERBS range from 
10.5 to 15.2 percent per month, and all are significant at the one percent level.  These 
estimates are consistent with the finding that exchange-rate-based-stabilizations are 
associated with output booms (Calvo and Végh, 1998; Fischer et al., 1999 Végh, 1992;).  
The point estimates of the coefficient on NONERBS range from 10.2 to 12.1 percent per 
month and are also significant at the one-percent level.  The column labeled “P-Value of 
ERBS>NONERBS” shows that the p-value for an F-test that the coefficient on ERBS is 
significantly different from the coefficient on NONERBS  is not significant for any 
specification in Table 4.  Therefore, the point estimates of ERBS are statistically 
indistinguishable from those for NONERBS.   20
The evidence in Table 4, taken together with the evidence in Table 2, suggests 
that the stock market responds more favorably to the stabilization of high inflation than it 
does to the stabilization of moderate inflation, regardless of whether the stabilization 
program is exchange-rate-based or not.  Thus, the stock market evidence also supports 
Easterly’s (1996) finding that output booms are not limited to exchange-rate-based 
stabilizations of high inflation.  However, this point should not be overstated, because the 
results are based on relatively few observations (25 total, 8 ERBS). 
 
III.C.2 Are the High Inflation Results Driven by Difference in IMF and Non-IMF 
Sponsored Stabilization Programs? 
Two additional sets of empirical tests suggest that the differential stock market 
responses are not driven by differences between IMF and non-IMF stabilization policies.
6  
First, the stock market response to attempted stabilizations of high and moderate inflation 
were re-estimated excluding the non-IMF-sponsored programs from the high inflation 
sample.  Specifically, a new dummy variable called IMFHIGH was created.  This 
variable takes on the value one just in those cases where attempts to stabilize high 
inflation were implemented through an official IMF agreement.  The coefficient on 
IMFHIGH was positive, significant, and significantly different than the coefficient on 
MODERATE.  Thus, the difference between the average stock market response to 
attempted stabilizations of high and moderate inflation remains economically and 
statistically significant when the non-IMF-sponsored programs are excluded from the 
high inflation sample. 
                                                 
6 For brevity, the results are simply reported and the accompanying tables are not included.  These tables 
are available upon request.   21
Second, estimations were performed to compare the mean response of the stock 
market to IMF and non-IMF sponsored attempts at stabilizing high inflation.  The 
coefficients on IMFHIGH and NONIMFHIGH were both positive and significant.   
However, the hypothesis that IMFHIGH=NONIMFHIGH could not be rejected.  Thus, 
the evidence suggests that there is no significant difference between the average stock 
market reaction to the attempted stabilization of high inflation in the IMF and non-IMF 
sub-samples.  Overall, the evidence in this subsection and in III.C.1 suggest that the 
central empirical result is not driven by differences in the way countries attempt to 
stabilize high versus moderate inflation. 
 
III.  Does the Stock Market Get it Right? 
This section of the paper asks whether the stock market rationally forecasts 
stabilization outcomes.  The analysis employs three approaches.  The first approach 
examines if controlling for previous failed stabilizations strengthens the positive 
relationship between the stock market response and the ex-ante inflation rate.  The second 
approach asks whether the stock market response helps predict the ex-post change in 
inflation.  The third approach explores whether the unexpected change in the stock 
market helps predicts ex-post GDP growth.
7 
 
III.A.  Stock Market Responses and Ex-Ante Inflation Rates Revisited  
  If the stock market is rational, then it may place a lower probability of success on 
stabilization programs that follow on the heels of failed attempts.  A lower probability of 
                                                 
7 The approaches taken here are similar in spirit to Dominguez et al. (1988) and Shapiro (1988).  
Dominguez et al. examine whether stock price data help forecast the great depression.  Shapiro uses stock 
prices and dividend yields to study the success of economic policy in smoothing the volatility of real 
activity in the U.S. after World War II.   22
success will decrease the stock market response to news of stabilization.  Therefore, a 
low probability of success may explain why the stock price change is close to zero for a 
number of high-inflation episodes in Figure 1.  This discussion suggests that the 
relationship between the stock market response and ex-ante inflation after controlling for 
past failures should be stronger than the unconditional relationship documented in 
Section III.B.  Two approaches are taken.   
First, equation (2) is re-estimated.  This time the inflation rate is interacted with a 
variable called PREVFAIL.  PREVFAIL is equal to one if there was a failed stabilization 
in the previous 24 months (robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2 R =0.22, N=81): 
[0, 1] ln( ) 2.21 0.203* 0.158( * ) stockprice inflation inflation prevfail + ∆= + −                       (8) 
                                     (0.9)   (3.6)                  (-2.6)   
 
The conditional relationship between the stock market change and the average pre-
stabilization inflation rate is stronger than the unconditional one.  Relative to equation (2) 
the coefficient on INFLATION is higher, the robust t-statistic is larger, and the R-squared 
is bigger.  The interactive term, INFLATION*PREVFAIL also has the expected negative 
sign and is significant.   
As a second pass at the data, Figure 2 plots the implementation window stock 
price change versus the average 12-month inflation rate for only those episodes that were 
not preceded by a failed stabilization in the previous 24 months.  There are 41 such 
episodes.  Figure 2 and equation (9) below exhibit a tighter positive linear relationship 
between the stock price change and inflation than Figure 1 and equation (2), which do not 
control for past failures.  The trend line in Figure 2 is given by the following equation 
(robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2 R =0.48, N=41):   23
[0, 1] ln( ) 2.51 0.237* stockprice inflation + ∆= − +                                                                  (9) 
                                      (-0.9)  (4.7)   
The outlier in the upper right hand corner of Figure 2 is Peru.  In 1989 and 1990 
the average inflation rate in Peru was 344 percent and real GDP fell by 12.3 and 5.5 
percent, respectively.  In August of 1990 Alberto Fujimori was inaugurated as the new 
prime minister and implemented a sweeping stabilization program, which came to be 
known as “Fujishock.”  The stock market increased by 100 percent in real dollar terms 
between August and September.  In 1991 inflation fell to 44 percent and real GDP grew 
by 6.7 percent.  The positive linear relationship in Figure 2 remains significant if Peru is 
removed. 
 
III.B.  Do the Stock Market Responses Predict Ex-Post Changes in Inflation? 
  To the extent that the stock market response predicts the expected net benefit that 
will accrue to shareholders as a result of stabilizing inflation, it should also have some 
predictive power for the ex-post change in inflation.  Specifically, the ex-ante stock price 
response should be negatively associated with the ex-post change in inflation.  Figure 3 
examines whether the data support this prediction.  The variable on the y-axis is the 
change in inflation: the average 12-month inflation rate in the year after stabilization 
minus the 12-month inflation rate in the two years prior to stabilization.  The variable on 
the x-axis is the unexpected stock price change (as measured by the cumulative abnormal 
return for months [0,+1]).  The trend line in Figure 3 is given by the following equation 
(robust t-statistics in parentheses 
2 R =0.05, N=81): 
 
[0, 1] 6.60 0.546* ln( ) inflation stockprice + ∆= − − ∆                                                           (10) 
                      (-1.2)   (-2.2)                      24
 
 
The stock price response to stabilization seems to have some unconditional 
predictive power for what will happen to inflation in the following year. 
 
III.C.  Do the Stock Market Responses Predict Future GDP Growth? 
  To the extent that the stock market response to stabilization capitalizes the 
expected net output benefits, then there should be a positive relationship between the ex-
ante stock price change and GDP growth outcomes following the stabilization.  The 
unexpected stock market change should reflect the “news” about future GDP growth.  If 
the sample mean is taken as a measure of the expected future growth rate, then the 
deviation of GDP growth from its country-specific sample mean is a metric of the news 
in GDP growth.   
  Figure 4 compares the average deviation of real GDP growth in years [0, +3] with 
the average deviation over the pre-stabilization period (years [-3, -1]), for all episodes of 
attempted stabilizations of high inflation.  Region B, the area above the average pre-
stabilization deviation, is substantially larger than Region A, the area below.  Figure 5 
compares the average deviation in stabilization years [0, +3] with the average deviation 
over the pre-stabilization period, for all episodes of attempted stabilizations of moderate 
inflation.  In this figure, Region B is not substantially larger than Region A.  Overall, the 
comparisons appear at least roughly consistent with the discounted evidence provided by 
the stock market (Table 2). 
Figure 6 plots the GDP news measure versus the unexpected stock price change.  
The graph suggests that the stock market has predictive power.  The corresponding   25
regression confirms the statistical significance of the apparent relationship (robust t-
statistics in parentheses 
2 R =0.09, N=81): 
0.42 0.0476* ln( ) GDPDEVIATION stockprice =− + ∆                                                    (11) 
                                   (-1.0)    (2.9).      
Equation (11) indicates that, on average, an unexpected stock price increase of 
100 predicts GDP growth in the following year that is 4.76 percentage points above its 
sample mean.  This equation should not be given a causal interpretation.  It does not say 
that the unexpected stock market change causes growth. 
 
IV.  Discussion of the Results and Their Relationship to Previous Work  
This paper uses the stock market to provide an ex-ante measure of the effect that a 
stabilization program is expected to have on the present value of current and expected 
future profits.  The stock market provides a cost-benefit analysis of disinflation.  The 
stock market approach removes the time dimension of stabilization by collapsing the 
entire future stream of stabilization costs and benefits into a single summary statistic.  
This net present value analysis focuses attention on the relevant issue of whether the 
benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs. 
One limitation of this approach is that the stock market provides a cost-benefit 
analysis of expected current and future profits.  This is not the same thing as a cost-
benefit analysis of current and expected future output.  Therefore, the results speak only 
to shareholder welfare and do not tell us whether disinflation increases or decreases the 
present value of aggregate output.  Nevertheless, understanding the effect of disinflation 
on the present value of profits may deepen our understanding of the broader real effects 
of disinflation.   26
The Phillips Curve view of disinflation holds that efforts to reduce inflation will 
cause a temporary fall in output (Ball, 1994; Fischer, 1986; Friedman, 1968; Lucas, 1973; 
Okun, 1978; Phelps, 1968).  In Phillips-Curve-based analyses of disinflation, the short-
run cost of reducing inflation is measured as the sum of undiscounted output losses over 
some horizon (Blanchard, 1999; Dornbusch and Fischer, 1998; Hall and Taylor, 1997; 
Mankiw, 1997).  This approach assumes that there are long-run output benefits associated 
with disinflation, without making them explicit in a cost-benefit calculation.  Therefore, 
these analyses do not directly address the issue of whether the benefits of disinflation 
outweigh the costs.  The stock market approach taken in this paper focuses attention on 
the relevant issue of whether the benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs. 
In contrast to the traditional view of disinflation, advocates of rational 
expectations argue that disinflation need not be costly if policy makers credibly commit 
to reducing inflation.  Under this view, the initial level of inflation should be largely 
irrelevant.  Sargent (1982) provides supporting evidence for the rational expectations 
view.  He presents case studies of four countries that abruptly halted post-World War I 
hyperinflations at virtually no cost to output. 
In fact, more recent work finds that countries may even experience output booms 
while stabilizing high inflation (Végh, 1992).  Calvo and Végh (1998) document seven 
episodes of expansionary stabilization of high inflation.  Fischer et al., (1999) document 
nine episodes.  Easterly (1996) provides broader evidence against the traditional view of 
disinflation.  He studies twenty-eight episodes of high inflation that were successfully 
stabilized and shows that output expanded on average.  In contrast to the recent evidence 
that reducing high inflation is expansionary, Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) conclude that   27
moderate inflation can be reduced to low inflation only at a substantial short-term cost to 
output.  This conclusion is based on their case study of four countries that successfully 
reduced moderate inflation to low inflation. 
Taken together, this recent evidence seems to suggest that disinflation is 
expansionary when starting from high levels of inflation, but contractionary when 
inflation is moderate.  However, these studies focus exclusively on episodes where 
inflation was successfully reduced.  Calvo and Végh (1998) argue that selection bias 
clouds the interpretation of studies that focus exclusively on episodes where inflation was 
successfully reduced, instead of all attempts at stabilizing inflation.  To illustrate the 
theoretical content of Calvo and Végh’s argument, imagine that a country experiencing 
high inflation implements a stabilization program.  Now suppose that this country 
experiences a favorable output shock.  The shock creates two measurement problems.  
First, it causes an output boom, which generates a specious positive correlation between 
stabilization and output growth.  Second, the boom generates a windfall in tax revenue, 
which reduces the government’s need for inflationary finance and therefore raises the 
probability of a successful stabilization. 
Figure 7 illustrates the empirical thrust of Calvo and Végh’s (1998) selection bias 
critique.  The figure plots the average deviation of annual output growth from its sample 
mean for two subsets of the high inflation episodes to be studied in this paper: those that 
were successfully stabilized and those that were not.  The graph for the successful cases 
suggests that stabilizing high inflation is expansionary, but it is also consistent with the 
view that stabilizations succeed because they coincide with favorable exogenous shocks.  
Indeed, the figure shows that unsuccessful stabilizations are associated with below   28
average growth. 
However, the graph for the unsuccessful stabilizations is also consistent with 
multiple interpretations.  Countries may experience recessions because (1) stabilization 
policy is contractionary; (2) growth may not improve because the government is not 
committed to stabilizing inflation; (3) attempts at stabilizing high inflation may fail 
because of adverse exogenous shocks.  Thus, the general message of Figure 7 is that 
selective examination of ex-post realizations of GDP growth may not accurately measure 
the real effects of stabilization policy.  In a world where economic agents are rational and 
forward-looking, one ideally wants an ex-ante measure of the effect the stabilization 
program is expected to have on current and future real output.  
This paper uses the stock market to provide an ex-ante measure of the effect the 
stabilization program is expected to have on the present value of current and expected 
future profits.  Again, measuring the effect of disinflation on the present value of profits 
is not equivalent to measuring the effect of disinflation on the present value of aggregate 
output.  Nevertheless, the stock market approach also focuses attention on the relevant 
issue of whether the benefits of disinflation outweigh the costs.  Furthermore, answering 
the narrow question of whether disinflation is good for the stock market may provide 
clues about the broader issue of whether disinflation is a positive net present value event 
for the economy as a whole.   
For example, under the traditional view, the total social cost of disinflation 
increases monotonically with the initial level of inflation.
8  The 24 percent jump in real 
equity prices in anticipation of reducing high inflation seems at odds with this prediction.  
However, it is possible that stabilizing high inflation is costly in the short run, but these 
                                                 
8 For a given sacrifice ratio.     29
costs are swamped by the long-run benefits.  Therefore, the high inflation results could be 
consistent with the traditional view.  Analogously, the negligible (and possibly negative) 
stock price response in anticipation of stabilizing moderate inflation appears more 
consistent with the traditional view than with rational expectations.  However, it is 
possible that stabilizing moderate inflation is costless in the short run, but also generates 
minimal long-run growth benefits (Burton and Fischer, 1998; Bruno and Easterly, 1998).  
Hence, the moderate inflation results could be consistent with rational expectations.
9  The 
stock market data cannot resolve these issues but they provide a fresh source of evidence 
in favor of the view that efforts at stabilizing high inflation have very different real 
implications than those directed at moderate inflation. 
 
V.  Objections and Alternative Interpretations 
The paper documents that attempting to stabilize high inflation is good for the 
stock market, but attempting to stabilize moderate inflation is not.  This result begs an 
obvious question.  Why does the stock market respond more positively to attempts at 
stabilizing high inflation than those directed at moderate inflation?  A definitive answer 
lies beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, the emphasis of the present article is on 
answering a smaller question.  Is disinflation good for the stock market?  Given that there 
is no systematic evidence on this narrower question, establishing a fact in need of further 
explanation seems like a reasonable first step.  The remainder of this section highlights 
some of the key issues that may be addressed by future work. 
                                                 
9 The moderate inflation results for months [0,+1] could also be consistent with disinflation being neutral.  
However, the pre-stabilization window evidence in Table 3 suggests that this is not the case.   30
First, it would be helpful to have a sense as to how much of the observed stock 
market responses are due to changes in discount rates versus profits.  One approach might 
be to look at data on total market dividends and dividend yields.  These data would allow 
for a crude analysis of changes in discount rates and cash flows using the dividend 
discount model as in Blanchard (1993).  Unfortunately, these data are not available for 
the entire sample period in all countries. 
Second, the observed differences in the stock market responses for cases of high 
versus moderate inflation may be driven by exogenous factors for which the analysis is 
unable to control.  For example, stabilizing high inflation might signal broader future 
macroeconomic reforms, whereas stabilizing moderate inflation might not (Bruno and 
Easterly, 1996; Collins, 1990).
10  In such cases, the stock market may respond more 
favorably to attempted stabilizations of high inflation, even if there are no substantial 
differences in the expected real effects of stabilizing high versus moderate inflation per 
se.  Using short event windows reduces the chance of contamination from confounding 
major events that are unrelated to stabilization.  However, even a short window does not 
entirely eliminate the concern.  The evidence relating the stock market response to ex-
post inflation and growth outcomes is also subject to a similar critique.   
Third, there is the potential for reverse causality.  If strong economic performance 
drives policy-makers to initiate stabilization programs, then the estimated stock market 
response to attempts at stabilizing high inflation may be upward biased.
11  T h e  p r e -
                                                 
10 The differences between high and moderate inflation may also be a function of the way in which inflation 
interacts with the taxation of financial assets (Feldstein, 1980).  A detailed study of the tax systems of the 
21 countries in the sample lies outside the scope of this paper. 
11 Collins (1996) makes a similar conceptual point with respect to drawing conclusions about the real 
effects of moving from a fixed to flexible exchange rate regime.   31
stabilization-window evidence (Table 3) and the data on GDP growth (Figures 4 and 5) 
do not suggest reverse causality, but the possibility cannot be dismissed.   
Finally, most of the moderate inflation episodes are identified using IMF 
agreements.  Section I of the paper provides evidence in support of the view that IMF 
programs are tantamount to traditional disinflation programs.  If inflation reduction is not 
a major objective of IMF programs, then the stock market results for the cases of 
moderate inflation may suggest that IMF programs are of marginal net benefit when 
inflation stabilization is not the major objective. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
Previous research in macroeconomics and finance does not address the following 
question.  Is disinflation good for the stock market?  This paper provides an answer by 
analyzing how stock markets respond to the adoption of inflation stabilization programs.  
The evidence suggests three key results.  First, the average stock market response to 
attempts at stabilizing high inflation is large--the stock market increases by 24 percent in 
real dollar terms--and is reliably significant.  Second, the expected net benefits of 
stabilizing moderate inflation are economically weak and statistically insignificant.   
Third, the stock market response to attempted stabilizations is a reliable, though 
admittedly noisy, predictor of changes in future inflation and output growth.  This third 
result suggests that the stock market evidence is not spurious.  Taken together, these 
results buttress previous findings that the real consequences of stabilizing high and 
moderate inflation are very different.  Future research should try and uncover the 
underlying mechanisms responsible for these differences.   32
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Figure 1.  The Stock Market Response to Implementation of a Stabilization Program as a 
Function of the Pre-Stabilization Level of Inflation
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
-50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Average 12-Month Inflation Rate for the Prior 2 Years
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
I
n
d
e
x  37
Figure 2.   The Stock Market Response to Implementation of a Stabilization Program as a 
Function of the Pre-Stabilization Level of Inflation: No Failed Stab in Previous 24 months
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Figure 3.  Change In the Inflation Rate in Year +1 as a Function of the Stock Market Response 
to Implementation of a Stabilization Program
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Figure 4.   Average Deviation of Real GDP Growth From Country-Specific Sample Mean: All 
Attempted Stabilizations of High Inflation
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Figure 5.   Average Deviation of Real GDP Growth From Country-Specific Sample Mean: All 
Attempted Stabilizations of Moderate Inflation
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Figure 6.  GDP Growth "News" in Year +1  as a Function of the  Stock Market Response to 
Implementation of a Stabilization Program
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Figure 7.   Average Deviation of Real GDP Growth From Country-Specific Sample Mean 
Around Attempted Stabilizations of High Inflation Episodes
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Table 1.  Differences Between Median Stock Price Reactions to Attempted Stabilizations of High Versus Moderate Inflation Under Three Different 
Classifications of High and Moderate Inflation 
      
  Bruno Easterly Classification Two-Way  Numerical  Split  Three-Way Numerical Split 
           
  High     Moderate     High  Moderate  High    Moderate      Low 
Number of 
Episodes 
25 56  40 41  27  27 27 
            
Median  Inflation  118  15  77 11  116  26 10 
            
Median Stock 
Price Change 
16 1  14 1  15  11 1 
            
Number  Negative  6  25  11 20  7 10 14 
            
P-Value  0.01 0.25  0.01 0.5  0.01  0.12 0.65 
Notes: Table 1 divides the 81 stabilization episodes into three groups based on levels of average inflation prior to implementation.  The first grouping corresponds to the Bruno 
Easterly (1998) classification of high versus moderate inflation; the second simply divides the total sample into two groups of equal size: high and moderate inflation.  The third 
comparison splits the sample into three groups of equal size: high, moderate, and low inflation.  The first three rows provide summary statistics for each grouping: the number of 
episodes, the median inflation rate and the median stock price response for the high and moderate categories under each inflation classification scheme.  The fourth row reports the 
number of episodes for which the stock price change over the two-month-implementation window is less than the median (country-specific) two-month stock price change. The 
last row reports the two-sided p-value of observing at most the corresponding number of stock price responses to stabilization below the median (country-specific) two-month 
percentage change in the stock price.     44
Table 2.  Differences Between Average Stock Market Reactions to Attempted Stabilizations of High Versus Moderate Inflation Under 
the Bruno Easterly Classification of High and Moderate Inflation 
  
Panel A: Month [0, +1] Estimates 
  
Panel B: Month [0] Estimates 
  
HIGH 
 
MODERATE 
 
P-Value of 
HIGH> 
MODERATE 
 
  
HIGH 
 
MODERATE 
 
P-Value of 
HIGH> 
MODERATE 
          
World 0.121*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00   0.126*** 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
0.00 
              
U.S. 0.119*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00   0.121*** 
(0.032) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.00 
              
LDC 0.113*** 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.00   0.081** 
(0.037) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
0.08 
              
All 0.114*** 
(0.026) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
0.00   0.080** 
(0.037) 
0.006 
(0.02) 
0.07 
              
Constant-
Mean 
0.122*** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00   0.124*** 
(0.032) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.00 
              
Country- 
Mean 
0.122*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.00   0.122*** 
(0.033) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
0.00 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  The estimation procedure is feasible generalized least squares.  Heteroscedastic-consistent 
standard errors are given in parentheses.  The column labeled Month [0,+1] presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using the two-month announcement 
window described in the text.  The column labeled Month [0] presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE using the one-month announcement window described in 
the text.  The first row presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE from the benchmark specification using a World stock return index.  Row 2 presents estimates of 
HIGH and MODERATE from a specification that uses U.S. stock returns in place of a World stock return index in equation (3).  Row 3 presents estimates that use the 
IFC Emerging Market index.  Row 4 presents estimates that use all three sets of returns simultaneously.  Row 5 presents estimates of HIGH and MODERATE based 
on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns.  Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model, which allows for country-specific intercept terms.  The column labeled 
P-Value of HIGH>MODERATE: shows the p-value for a test that the coefficient on HIGH is significantly larger than the coefficient on MODERATE.  The symbols 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.   45
Table 3.  Does the Stock Market Anticipate Attempted Stabilizations?  Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns Associated With 
the 12-Month Window Preceding Attempted Stabilizations of High Versus Moderate Inflation Under the Bruno and Easterly Classification of 
High and Moderate Inflation 
      
  Panel A: World-Return Model    Panel B: Constant-Mean-Return Model 
             
    High Inflation    Moderate Inflation    High Inflation    Moderate Inflation 
Month 
Relative to 
Stabilization 
 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
 
AR CAR 
-12   -.036  -.036    -.008  -.008  -.038  -.038    -.010  -.010 
                        
-11   -.033  -.069    -.018  -.026  -.033  -.070    -.016  -.026 
                        
-10   -.053  -.122    -.012  -.038  -.050  -.121    -.014  -.040 
                        
-9   .007  -.116    -.010  -.048   .002  -.119    -.012  -.052 
                        
-8   -.005  -.121    -.007  -.054    -.003  -.122    -.007  -.058 
                        
-7   .027  -.094    .011  -.043   .028  -.094    .012  -.047 
                        
-6   .042  -.052    -.020  -.063   .043  -.051    -.019  -.065 
                        
-5   .035  -.018    -.023  -.086   .037  -.014    -.024  -.090 
                        
-4   -.005  -.022    -.030  -.116    -.004  -.018    -.030  -.120 
                        
-3   .057  .035    -.026  -.142   .060  .041    -.026  -.146 
                        
-2   -.028  .006    -.008  -.150    -.025  .016    -.007  -.153 
                        
-1   -.030  -.023    -.014  -.163    -.032  -.016    -.013  -.166 
                        
0   .088  .064    -.008  -.172    .085  .069    -.007  -.173 
                        
1   .126  .190    .011  -.161    .127  .196    .011  -.162 
Notes: The abbreviation AR stands for abnormal return.  The abnormal return for month [n] is defined as the coefficient on a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 in 
nth month before implementation of the stabilization.  The abnormal returns in Panel A are calculated using regression equation (3) in the text.  The abnormal returns in 
Panel B are generated using regression equation (4) in the text.    46
Table 4.  Differences Between Average Stock Market Reactions to Exchange-Rate-Based (ERBS) Versus Non-Exchange-Rate 
Based Stabilizations (NONERBS) of High Inflation 
                   
  Panel A: Month [0, +1] Estimates    Panel B: Month [0] Estimates 
  
 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
Non 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
 
P-Value of 
ERBS>NON 
ERBS 
  
 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
Non 
Exchange-
Rate-Based 
Stabilization 
  
 
P-Value of 
ERBS>NON 
ERBS 
                   
World 0.152*** 
(0.037) 
 0.102*** 
(0.029) 
 0.28    0.154*** 
(0.052) 
 0.109*** 
(0.041) 
 0.49 
                      
U.S. 0.148*** 
(0.037) 
 0.100*** 
(0.029) 
 0.31    0.146*** 
(0.052) 
 0.106*** 
(0.041) 
 0.55 
                      
LDC 0.105*** 
(0.04) 
 0.121*** 
(0.034) 
 0.77    0.039 
(0.055) 
 0.113** 
(0.049) 
 0.308 
                      
All 0.122*** 
(0.034) 
 0.105*** 
(0.04) 
 0.75    0.035 
(0.055) 
 0.116** 
(0.049) 
 0.27 
                      
Constant-
Mean 
0.152*** 
(0.037) 
 0.102*** 
(0.029) 
 0.29    0.151*** 
(0.052) 
 0.108*** 
(0.041 
 0.52 
                      
Country-
Mean 
0.150*** 
(0.037) 
 0.103*** 
(0.029) 
 0.32    0.149*** 
(0.052) 
 0.106*** 
(0.042) 
 0.52 
Notes: The left-hand-side variable is real, dollar-denominated stock returns.  The estimation procedure is feasible generalized least squares.  Heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses.  The column labeled Month [0,+1] presents estimates of the stock market response to exchange-rate-based 
and non-exchange-rate-based stabilizations of high inflation using the two-month announcement window described in the text.  The column labeled Month [0] 
presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS using the one-month announcement window described in the text.  The first row presents estimates using the 
benchmark specification using a World stock return index.  Row 2 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses U.S. stock returns 
in place of the World stock return index in equation (6).  Row 3 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses the IFC Emerging 
Market index.  Row 4 presents estimates of ERBS and NONERBS from a specification that uses all three sets of returns simultaneously.  Row 5 presents 
estimates based on simple mean-adjusted abnormal returns.  Row 6 presents estimates using a statistical model, which allows for country-specific intercept terms.  
The column labeled P-Value of ERBS>NONERBS shows the p-value for a test that the stock market response to exchange-rate-based stabilizations of high 
inflation is significantly different from the stock market response to non-exchange-rate-based stabilizations of high inflation.  The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.  Data Appendix: Is Disinflation Good for the Stock Market? 
Each panel of Table A1 corresponds to a given country.  Column 1 identifies the 
country to which each panel applies.  Column 2 enumerates the month and year of all the 
stabilization programs that were implemented in each of the countries during the sample 
period (the period for which stock market data are available for each country).  Columns 
3 and 4 provide information on how the stabilization dates in Column 2 were identified.  
A “Yes” in a given row of column 3 indicates that the stabilization date in the 
corresponding row of Column 1 is a Calvo and Végh (1998) episodic stabilization 
program.  A “Yes” in a given row of column 4 indicates that an agreement was signed 
with the IMF.  The type of IMF agreement is given in parentheses.  SB denotes a Stand-
By agreement and EFF denotes an Extended Fund Facility agreement.
1 
Column 5 provides information on the nature of the inflation regime that existed 
at the time the stabilization program was initiated.  A “Yes” in Column 5 indicates that 
the country was experiencing high inflation.  A “Yes” in Column 6 indicates that there 
was a stabilization program in the previous 24 months.  A “Yes” in Column 7 indicates 
that there was a stabilization program in the subsequent 24 months.  A “Yes” in Column 
8 indicates that the stabilization program was ex-post successful.  In keeping with the 
spirit of the Bruno and Easterly (1995) definition of high inflation, a stabilization 
program implemented in the midst of high inflation is defined as ex-post successful if 
                                                 
1 Stand-By (SB) arrangements typically cover periods of one to two years and focus on macroeconomic 
policies--such as fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies--aimed at overcoming balance of payments 
difficulties.  Most programs supported by stand-by arrangements also include some policies to address 
structural or supply-side weakness, although because of the short duration of these arrangements, this focus 
is not as strong as in extended arrangements.  Under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), the IMF supports 
medium-term programs through extended arrangements that generally run for three or four years and are 
aimed at overcoming balance of payments difficulties stemming from macroeconomic and structural 
problems. 
    
(prior to the implementation of another stabilization program) annualized monthly 
inflation falls below 40 percent and remains below 40 percent for two or more years.  In 
accordance with Dornbusch and Fischer (1993) and Burton and Fischer (1998), a 
stabilization program implemented in the midst of moderate inflation is defined as ex-
post successful if annualized monthly inflation falls below 10 percent and remains below 
10 percent for two or more years.  A “Yes” in Column 9 indicates that the stabilization 
program was exchange-rate-based according to Calvo and Vegh (1998) and Fischer et al. 
(1999). 
The databases Lexis/Nexis Research Software Version 4.06 and the Dow Jones 
Interactive Publications Library were searched in an attempt to find announcement dates 
corresponding to the implementation dates listed in Table A1.  For most stabilization 
programs no announcement dates were available.  In other cases, the “announcement” 
corresponds to informal agreements between the country and the IMF in advance of the 
official signing (i.e., implementation date) of the stabilization program, which begs the 
question of when the market first learned of the negotiations leading to the informal 
agreement.  Thus, the search reinforces Easterly’s (1996) point that announcement dates 
uncovered using public news sources are likely to be poor proxies for the date at which 
information about the stabilization first reaches market participants.  In the absence of 
reliable data on announcement dates, this study focuses on implementation dates.  This 
approach may bias against finding any effect of stabilization if stabilizations are 
anticipated.   
Table A1.  Inflation Stabilization Programs in Emerging Economies with Stock Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization  
Ex-Post  
Successful?  
 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Based? 
Panel A: 
Argentina 
          
  Aug 1976     Yes (SB)  Yes    Yes     
  Sept 1977    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Dec 1978  Yes (Tablita)    Yes  Yes      Yes 
  Jun 1983    Yes (SB)  Yes    Yes     
  Dec 1984    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Jun 1985  Yes (Austral)    Yes  Yes      Yes 
  Jul 1987    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes       
  Nov 1989  Yes (Bonex)    Yes  Yes  Yes     
 Jul  1991  Yes 
(Convertibility) 
Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
  Mar 1992    Yes (EFF)    Yes       
           
           
Panel B: 
Brazil 
          
  Mar 1983    Yes (SB)  Yes         
  Feb 1986  Yes (Cruzado)    Yes    Yes    Yes 
  Jul 1987  Yes (Bresser)    Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Aug 1988    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Jan 1989  Yes (Summer)    Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Apr 1990  Yes (Collor)    Yes  Yes  Yes     
  Jan 1992    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes       
  Mar 1994  Yes (Real)    Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes    
Table A1--Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization  
Ex-Post  
Successful?  
 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Based? 
Panel C: 
Chile 
          
  Feb 1978  Yes (Tablita)    Yes      Yes  Yes 
  Jan 1983    Yes (SB)           
  Aug 1985    Yes (EFF)           
  Nov 1989    Yes (SB)        Yes   
           
           
Panel D: 
Egypt 
          
  May 1991    Yes (SB)        Yes   
           
           
Panel E: 
India 
          
  Nov 1981    Yes (EFF)           
  Jan 1991    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Oct 1991    Yes (SB)    Yes       
            
            
Panel F: 
Indonesia 
          
  May 1973    Yes (SB)        Yes   
            
            
Panel G: 
Israel 
          
  Jul 1985  Yes    Yes      Yes  Yes    
Table A1--Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization  
Ex-Post  
Successful?  
 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Based? 
Panel H: 
Jamaica 
          
  Aug 1977    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Jun 1978    Yes (EFF)    Yes  Yes     
  Jun 1979    Yes (EFF)    Yes  Yes     
  Apr 1981    Yes (EFF)    Yes       
  Jun 1984    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Jul 1985    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Mar 1987    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Sept 1988    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Mar 1990    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Jun 1991    Yes (SB)    Yes  Yes     
  Dec 1992    Yes (SB)  Yes  Yes    Yes   
           
            
Panel I: 
Jordan 
          
  Jul 1989    Yes (SB)           
  Feb 1992    Yes (SB)           
  May 1994    Yes (EFF)           
            
            
Panel J:  
Kenya 
          
  May 1993    Yes         Yes      
Table A1--Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
Date of 
Stabilization 
Program 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodic 
 
 
 
 
IMF 
Agreement?
 
 
 
High 
Inflation 
Crisis? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Previous 24 
Months? 
 
 
Stabilization 
in the 
Following 
24 Months? 
 
 
 
Stabilization  
Ex-Post  
Successful?  
 
 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Based? 
Panel K: 
Korea 
          
  May 1977    Yes (SB)           
  Mar 1980    Yes (SB)      Yes  Yes   
  Feb 1981    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Jul 1983    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Jul 1985    Yes (SB)    Yes       
            
            
Panel L: 
Mexico 
          
  Jan 1977  Yes  Yes (EFF)    Yes       
  Jan 1983    Yes (EFF)           
  Nov 1986    Yes (SB)  Yes    Yes     
  Dec 1987  Yes (Pacto)    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  May 1989    Yes (EFF)           
            
            
            
Panel M: 
Nigeria 
          
  Jan 1987    Yes (SB)           
  Feb 1989    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Jan 1991    Yes (SB)    Yes          
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Panel N: 
Pakistan  
          
  Mar 1977     Yes (SB)           
  Nov 1980    Yes (EFF)      Yes     
  Dec 1981    Yes (EFF)    Yes       
  Dec 1988    Yes (SB)           
  Sept 1993    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Feb 1994    Yes (EFF)    Yes       
            
            
Panel O: 
Peru 
          
  Aug  1990  Yes   Yes      
  Mar 1993    Yes (EFF)  Yes      Yes   
            
            
Panel P: 
Philippines  
          
  Oct 1986    Yes (SB)           
  May 1989    Yes (EFF)      Yes     
  Feb 1991    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Jun 1994    Yes (EFF)           
            
            
Panel Q: S. 
Africa: 
          
  Jan 1976    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Aug 1976    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Nov 1982    Yes (SB)              
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Panel R: 
Thailand 
          
  Jul 1978    Yes (SB)           
  Jun 1981    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Nov 1982    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Jun 1985    Yes (SB)           
            
            
Panel S: 
Turkey 
          
  Jul 1994    Yes (SB)  Yes         
            
            
Panel T: 
Venezuela 
          
  Jun 1989    Yes (EFF)           
            
            
Panel U: 
Zimbabwe 
          
  Apr 1981    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Mar 1983    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Jan 1992    Yes (EFF)      Yes     
  Sept 1992    Yes (EFF)    Yes       
           
Total 
Number 
 
81 
 
14 
 
69 
 
25 
 
42 
 
47 
 
12 
 
8 
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Panel R: 
Thailand 
          
  Jul 1978    Yes (SB)           
  Jun 1981    Yes (SB)      Yes     
  Nov 1982    Yes (SB)    Yes       
  Jun 1985    Yes (SB)           
            
            
Panel S: 
Turkey 
          
  Jul 1994    Yes (SB)  Yes         
            
            
Panel T: 
Venezuela 
          
  Jun 1989    Yes (EFF)           
            
            
Panel U: 
Zimbabwe 
          
  Apr 1981    Yes (SB)      Yes     
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